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INTRODUCTION 
This paper will keep company with others that consider the 
regulation of over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives, and the particular 
role and potential effectiveness of proposals in the new regulatory 
regimes that have emerged since the recent financial crisis (or crises, 
depending on how you count) for central clearing as a means of 
mitigating systemic risk.1 
                                                                                                     
† This paper is based on a keynote address to securities regulators delivered at the 36th 
Annual IOSCO Conference held in Cape Town, South Africa, in April 2011.  The paper 
has been updated to include, among other things, a description of P.R.I.M.E. Finance, 
the financial markets tribunal and disputes center, which opened for business January 
16, 2012.  The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Komadhi 
Mardemootoo, a former student at the London School of Economics and Political 
Science, in preparing this paper for publication. 
* Visiting Professor, London School of Economics and Political Science; Chairman, 
The P.R.I.M.E. Finance Foundation; Retired Founding Partner, US Law Practice, Allen 
& Overy LLP. 
 1. See Joanne P. Braithwaite, Private Law and the Public Sector’s Central 
Counterparty Prescription for the Derivatives Markets, (LSE Legal Studies Working 
Paper No. 2/2011, 2011), available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/ 
WPS2011-02_Braithwaite.pdf. 
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However, in what follows, I want the reader to think outside the 
current regulatory debate for a moment.  Instead, I would ask the reader 
to pause while contemplating the subject of systemic risk in the global 
financial markets and consider how courts and judges fit in. 
I. THE COURTS AS HOSPITALS 
Our newspapers are full of articles about financial market 
regulation.  Parliamentarians and congressmen do not shy away from 
weighing in on this subject too.  Financial regulation can be seen as a 
kind of ‘preventive medicine,’ and we attach great importance to getting 
it right. 
That is as it should be.  Preventive medicine in matters of both 
personal and financial health is important.  In the recent crisis, the 
malaise afflicting the financial markets had arguably reached epidemic 
proportions.  Financial market participants were, and some still are, 
seriously, if not terminally, ill.  Moreover, we can expect more accidents 
to occur and more victims to surface in the future.  However, as the 
courts are our ‘hospitals,’ perhaps we should worry more about the 
condition of the courts and whether we have enough qualified staff for 
them. 
It is indeed a little surprising that with all the debate about the 
future of financial regulation and the statements on the subject that 
politicians, regulators, economists and academics make—and even 
statements by the legal profession itself—so little attention has been 
paid to the role of our judges in mitigating risk.  After all, judges around 
the world interpret regulations, fill in the legislative and regulatory gaps, 
and resolve ambiguities.  In addition, they can be expected to settle any 
number of financial market disputes—some of them highly complex and 
technical—that are likely to follow from the considerable losses, and in 
some cases the demise, of major financial institutions and their 
counterparties. 
This paper aims to address an apparent gap in the debate.  What 
role should we wish to see our courts play in dealing with complex 
financial instruments, disputes arising from the financial crisis, and, in 
due course, matters requiring interpretation of the new regulatory 
regime?  Are the courts, as currently constituted, equipped to play that 
role?  Is there more that the markets, the regulatory community, and the 
legal profession can do to ready them? 
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II. WHY COURTS ARE IMPORTANT 
Why are courts relevant to discussions about financial market 
systemic risk?  Well, for a start, courts are potential allies of regulators 
in the battle to safeguard our financial markets from systemic risk.  
Courts in the United States and elsewhere have ‘fleshed out’ securities 
regulation in the past, thereby promoting legal certainty and, as a result, 
contributed to market stability.  That is why, as law students and young 
lawyers, although we were taught black letter law and we read 
regulations, we spent a lot more time reading and studying cases.  When 
addressing questions such as, “How much due diligence should I do in 
connection with this IPO?”, we looked to the cases:  in one such case we 
read what one lawyer did (poor young Stanton)—and it wasn’t enough; 
while another told the story of a lawyer who did do enough.  The cases 
showed the way to the ‘safe harbors’ into which to sail, gave examples 
of ‘shipwrecks’ as a warning along the way, and, most importantly, 
related the principles of law and regulation to real world facts.  The facts 
will change, and the facts are always important.   
Intelligently interpreting financial market regulations in light of 
new facts will continue to be important.  Judges who understand finance 
can do this.  Therefore, the courts can potentially play an important role 
in the battle against financial market systemic risk.  However, when it 
comes to the derivatives markets and complex product litigation, the 
courts can also be a source of systemic risk.  I will tell you why I think 
that and suggest steps to address this issue.  However, first I will discuss 
two more reasons why I think this issue—the role of the courts—is so 
important for derivatives product regulation and complex product 
litigation. 
A. THE STAKES ARE HIGH 
The stakes are high.  The amount of money at risk is staggering.  
The Bank for International Settlements estimates the current size of the 
OTC derivatives market alone in terms of notional amounts outstanding 
at approximately $639 trillion.2  More than 90% of this amount is 
governed by a single standard form contract and terms.3 
                                                                                                     
 2. Statistics Release: OTC Derivatives Statistics at end-June 2012, BANK OF INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS (Nov. 13, 2012), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1211.htm. 
The notional amounts reported are a measure of derivatives market activity and reflect 
both new and existing transactions. These amounts, however, are not a measure of risk. 
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A ‘tsunami’ of financial markets litigation from the financial crisis 
had been predicted, and the cases are pouring in.4  In one pending court 
case, $1.5 billion is in dispute.  The outcome of this case may turn on 
the court’s interpretation of two words in the parties’ ISDA Master 
Agreement.  Therefore, it is important that the decisions in major 
financial market cases and the precedent these cases produce are correct. 
B.  THE STUFF IS COMPLICATED 
The contracts, issues, and products are all complicated,5 and thus 
far the track record of the courts is not in all cases satisfactory.  For 
example, the financial crisis ushered in contradictory court decisions 
from cases based on similar facts, even as between New York and 
English courts.6  Thought of globally, these courts represent a de-
centralized system, with no Supreme Court to settle contradictory 
opinions and provide clear precedent. 
The markets worry all the time: wrong place, wrong party, judges 
and lawyers who would brief them who don’t get it.  The nature of the 
cases is also evolving from addressing issues with which judges have 
historically been both familiar and comfortable—such as authority (ultra 
vires), whether a contract formed and, if so, on what terms, the 
relationship between the counterparties or whether one party owed and 
                                                                                                     
The marked-to-market values of outstanding trades and the estimated credit exposure 
after netting would be significantly less, although still measured in trillions of dollars. 
 3. The forms are published by the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association, Inc. (formerly, the International Swaps Dealers Association, Inc. and, 
together, “ISDA”).  ISDA first published forms of its core master agreement in 1987, 
and since then the forms have been revised and re-published twice (1992 and 2002). 
 4. For a long list of parties and cases resulting from the failure of just one 
financial institution in 2008, see Parties, LEHMAN SECURITIES LITIGATION, available at 
at http://www.lehmansecuritieslitigation.com. 
 5. Jonathan Ross, The Case for P.R.I.M.E Finance: P.R.I.M.E Finance Cases, 7 
CAP. MARKETS L. J. 221, 223–26 (2012). According to the author, the community of 
professionals and jurists with a deep understanding of the issues, however, is quite 
limited at present. 
 6. See, e.g.,Belmont Park Invs. Pty. Ltd. v. BNY Corporate Tr. Servs. Ltd. & 
Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc., [2011] UKSC 38. Cf. In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. 
422 B.R. 407 (Bankr., S.D.N.Y. 2010).  See generally Ross supra note 5, at 259. 
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satisfied its duty of care7—to novel and more technical issues, like 
flawed asset and anti-deprivation theories,8 mathematical modeling, 
formulaic calculations, and global insolvency-proofing techniques.   
The remedies in the derivatives markets, for example, are very 
different from the remedies of the loan and bond markets, even though 
the contemplated cash flows may be similar.9  As a result, the cases may 
be especially challenging for judges without considerable familiarity 
with the relevant industry contracts.  Additionally, global market facts 
and trade usage are highly relevant and must be understood and 
accounted for.  Judges need an appetite for, and understanding of, 
comparative law and practice, as well as international finance.  There is 
little to demonstrate a propensity for this across all the courts that find 
complex product litigation before them. 
C. STANDARDIZATION 
In addition to these two factors—high stakes and complexity—
there is a third factor of particular importance: standardization.  
Widespread usage of master agreements and standard terms across 
geographical, cultural and language divides, has great benefits, 
including legal certainty and huge cost efficiencies.  We do not have a 
world parliament to legislate such matters, but the markets have created 
a kind of global law by contract.10  However, the use of such contracts 
creates significant risk.  The widespread usage of the same terms can 
amplify a court’s mistake in deciding a term’s proper meaning.11 
 “Whoosh”—that mistake goes around the globe, affecting trillions of 
                                                                                                     
 7. See, e.g., Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington London Borough 
Council [1994] A.C. 669; Bankers Trust Int’l PLC v. PT Dharmala Sakti Sejahtera, PT 
Dharmala Sakti Sejahtera v. Bankers Trust Int’l PLC and another (1996) C.L.C. 518. 
 8. See sources cited supra note 6. 
 9. There is the risk that when a non-expert court lacks familiarity or experience 
with derivatives and other complex financial products, the judge may be tempted to re-
characterize such ‘new’ products and treat them as something more familiar (like loans 
or even traditional insurance contracts) but in essence different from what the parties 
originally intended to create. 
 10. See Annelise Riles, The Anti-Network: Private Global Governance, Legal 
Knowledge, and the Legitimacy of the State, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 605 (2008). 
 11. Stephen J. Choi & C. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute 104 MICH L. REV. 1129, 
1130–73 (2006).  The authors suggest that standard form contracts, if in widespread 
use, may be “better viewed as akin to statutes” and should accordingly be interpreted as 
such. Id. at 1130.  See also Ross, supra note 7 at 241–46 for another discussion on 
interpretation. 
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dollars of trades.12  As a result, the market (i.e., parties outside the 
dispute) may have a greater interest in the outcome of a particular case 
than the two private parties who are litigating it.13   
Moreover, the parties to a dispute may not spot an issue of 
importance to the markets.  Or, having spotted it, they may have 
difficulty finding the requisite experts to give evidence in court.  The 
parties may not wish to, or may be unable to, spend what it takes to get a 
right answer.  There may be other strategic reasons why a party may not 
frame or develop an issue that others in the market view as extremely 
important.   
There are other challenges too.  Knowledgeable counsel may be 
conflicted.  Additionally, third party briefs may not be available or even 
admissible in certain jurisdictions,14 so that it may be difficult to get a 
market or regulator’s view in the proceedings.  Collectively, all these 
possibilities may be a source of systemic risk, particularly where there is 
commonality of standard contracts and trading terms in what constitutes 
a global market.   
                                                                                                     
 12. For instance, concern was expressed by ISDA over a series of recent rulings in 
the Seoul Central District Court in relation to Knock-in Knock-out (“KIKO”) currency 
option cases, citing “fundamental misconception” on the part of the court and the risk of 
“upsetting financial stability” if the decisions were upheld. See Press Release, ISDA 
Expresses Concern over KIKO Case Rulings (Apr. 1, 2009), available at 
http://www.isda.org/press/press040109.html. See also Hazell v. Hammersmith & 
Fulham London Borough Council [1992] 2 A.C. 1 (H.L) (appeal taken from Eng.), and 
Peregrine Fixed Income Ltd. (In Liquidation) v. Robinson Dep’t Store Pub. Co. Ltd. 
(2000) ALL E.R. (D) 1177, which provoked similar reactions. 
 13. Choi & Gulati, supra note 11, at 1132 (“[D]eference to the intentions of the 
specific parties before a court is especially inappropriate where there are third party 
effects.”) 
 14. In certain cases, an amicus type brief can help bridge the knowledge gap. See, 
e.g., In re Nat’l Gas Distributors, LLC, 556 F.3d 247 (4th Cir. 2009).  This case 
involved the first major interpretation of the Financial Netting Improvements Act of 
2006 and Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005.  ISDA 
played an amicus role at all stages through the appeal of the case to the US Court of 
Appeals.  For an example from the English courts, where the use of amicus briefs is 
more restricted, see Lomas and others v. JFB Firth Rixson Inc. (2012) EWCA Civ 419.  
In the Lomas proceedings, ISDA perceived that they had a legitimate interest in the true 
construction of their standard terms and applied for, and were granted, leave to 
intervene both at first instance and in the appeal of the lower court decision. In the 
judgment given, the appeals court appears to have relied upon and been largely 
persuaded by ISDA’s submissions. 
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Can we see, as a result, a blurring of lines in the kind of cases I am 
describing?  Lines that have traditionally, at least in common law courts, 
divided civil from criminal procedure.  Consider the following: A shoots 
B and stands trial; B forgives A, but the state objects, noting the state’s 
issue with people using guns to settle disputes and the need to protect 
public interest.  It is not for the private citizen alone to decide to settle 
this case, but rather for the state to decide. 
Now that we have seen considerable systemic consequence from 
market defaults—not only for counterparties, but also for a wide range 
of stakeholders, including pensioners and taxpayers—do we need a 
better way of ensuring that the wider market interest in such cases is 
similarly protected? 
Standard global contracts, like the ISDA master agreements, 
function more like treaties or statutes.15  However, unlike most 
important treaties, until now no court or tribunal is specifically 
dedicated to interpreting them.  It would be meaningless, when 
interpreting the provisions of such contracts to ask, “What did the 
parties intend?”  The answer is probably that they intended what the 
market working groups in some room, possibly long ago, intended—
rooms in which the contracting parties were not present and perhaps not 
represented.  We need experienced judges who know these answers or at 
least have a good grasp of the context in which the contract must be 
read. 
II. SETTLED LAW AND GLOBAL MARKETS 
(1) We need a settled body of law for the global financial markets.  
We need at least to learn from our mistakes.  We need to nurture a 
collective, and probably specialist, wisdom about the issues in these 
cases. 
(2) This is a very international affair—a particularly global business. 
We are apt to see two counterparties (for example, an African 
commodity producer hedging its risk with a European bank), each 
possibly from a civil code jurisdiction, each possibly a native French 
speaker, but using an English language, common law contract (like the 
ISDA Master).  Ideally, we would want judges who literally speak the 
language of the parties, and with a strong comparative law background. 
                                                                                                     
 15. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 11. 
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Is it correct that the parties should need to fly off to London or New 
York to settle their disputes?  Even if the judgments of those courts are 
not enforceable in either party’s home jurisdiction?16 
So, with decentralized courts, decentralized parties, common law 
contracts, civil code country players (or perhaps Islamic finance 
inspired), and complicated cases, there is a serious potential for wrong 
results, and of disaster stemming from those wrong results.  What can 
we do about this?  What would move things forward in a more positive 
way?  
III. P.R.I.M.E. FINANCE INITIATIVE 
Well, I hope that it will be good news that some of us are trying, 
proactively, to make a difference.  In late October 2010, on a Monday 
following a weekend meeting of G-20 finance ministers in Seoul, a 
group of sixty senior experts quietly gathered in the Peace Palace in The 
Hague to discuss this very issue.  The meeting was convened by Lord 
Woolf, the former Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, with 
support from the Dutch authorities.  There were twenty legal 
practitioners representing five centuries of “lawyer years” counseling in 
the derivatives markets.  There were another twenty from the 
market: CEOs, CLOs, dealers, buy-side, several (including the first) 
Chairmen of ISDA and of other relevant trade bodies.  Additionally, the 
President of the Dutch Central Bank, the Chairman of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, senior figures (participating in their 
individual capacities) from the European Central Bank, the Federal 
Reserve and the SEC, and some of the leading academics in the field, 
were also present. 
But perhaps most importantly, senior judges attended the meetings.  
The judges came from the Delaware Supreme Court, the Australian 
Federal Court, the New Zealand Court of Appeals and other national 
courts.  We worked hard then and, with continued Dutch government 
support, we have worked hard since.  I am pleased to report the 
                                                                                                     
 16. For a reporting of growing concerns in the financial markets about the 
enforceability of foreign court decisions in relevant jurisdictions, see for example, 
Memorandum for Members of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 
Inc: The use of arbitration under an ISDA Master Agreement, ISDA (Jan. 19 2011), 
available at http://www.isda.org/uploadfiles/_docs/FLRC_ISDA_Arbitration_Memo_ 
Jan11.pdf. (hereinafter “ISDA Memorandum”). 
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formation of a Panel of International Market Experts in Finance (or 
“P.R.I.M.E. Finance”) devoted to complex product and other financial 
market disputes, offering arbitration and mediation services, and 
committed to providing training for judges in national courts, expert 
testimony and advisory opinions as well. 
On January 16, 2012, Jan Kees De Jager, the then Finance Minister 
of the Netherlands, opened the P.R.I.M.E. Finance Disputes Center in 
The Hague.17  It is already a truly international panel of the senior legal 
and market experts in the field.  There are nearly 100 experts currently 
on the panel representing collectively more than 2,500 years of relevant 
experience.18  (There is also a “wait list” of an even greater number of 
nominee experts, many with impeccable credentials, lined up to help, 
and it is expected that the panel will continue to grow and broaden the 
diversity of its representation.) 
Diversity is also key because P.R.I.M.E. Finance hopes to play an 
important role in the resolution of financial market disputes where one 
or both parties is from a developing economy jurisdiction.  
Traditionally, many industry standard contracts have included clauses 
referring disputes to the courts of New York or England.  However, the 
decisions of these courts may not be enforceable in many jurisdictions 
where the parties may be organized or trade pursuant to these standard 
terms.  By virtue of the New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, P.R.I.M.E. Finance arbitral awards can 
be enforced in many such jurisdictions.19   
Now, have we “put our heads in the sand” with respect to central 
clearing and its relevance to the reduction of systemic risk as well?  
With all the focus on central counterparties and clearing, there is 
growing concern that dispute settlement between clearinghouses and 
                                                                                                     
 17. The opening of P.R.I.M.E. Finance attracted considerable media attention.  See, 
e.g., Caroline Binham, Financial Tribunal Opens to Settle Disputes, FINANCIAL TIMES, 
Jan. 15, 2012, available at, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/550ea69a-3f8e-11e1-8809-
00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=rss#axzz1jbCG84W3; Alison Ross, PRIME time, GLOBAL 
ARB. R. (Jan. 16, 2012), http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/30091/ 
prime-time/. For a fuller listing of relevant press coverage and articles, see 
http://www.primefinancedisputes.org/ 
index.php/news-blog/press-coverage, including earlier coverage in THE ECONOMIST, 
THE TIMES, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, FINANCIAL TIMES, GUARDIAN, THE AMERICAN 
LAWYER and in newspapers in China, Japan, Russia, the Netherlands, Kuwait, Brazil, 
Greece, Slovakia and Ukraine.   
 18. See Ross, supra note 7 at 227–29. 
 19. See ISDA Memorandum, supra note 16. 
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their members, and between clearing houses across jurisdictions, has 
been given short shrift. We know that there are some very thorny legal 
issues lurking, many still untested.  Many also believe the less 
sophisticated procedures and rule books used by clearinghouses in the 
past are unlikely to be fully up to the task of settling these disputes.20  
Yet the decisions in future may have greater systemic consequence.  A 
panel of prepared international experts could mitigate the risk of 
unsatisfactory results from dispute settlement efforts at and between 
clearinghouses and exchanges. 
In attracting talent to its rather ambitious task, the P.R.I.M.E. 
Finance Disputes Center is taking full advantage of a sociological 
phenomenon: a generation of market participants and their advisors—
the real experts in this field—are reaching retirement age.  They built 
the legal theory and infrastructure of the derivatives and structured 
finance industry through the formative years of the business.  They 
understand it.  And many of them are prepared to give back.  Many of us 
thought it would be a shame to let this opportunity slip by. 
CONCLUSION  
Financial market law litigation is probably increasing.  It is 
certainly complicated.  And, partly because of standard contracts and 
terms, and the volume of trading, wrong decisions threaten systemic 
risk.  In this sense at least, the interest of the markets in the outcome of a 
case may be far greater than the interest of the parties to that case.   
The current reliance on national tribunals of general jurisdiction 
and ad hoc arbitration is unsatisfactory.  It is too decentralized, too 
inefficient and too expensive, and, perhaps most importantly, it is failing 
to produce a settled and authoritative body of law or the predictability 
that the markets crave and on which financial stability may depend. 
Let me leave the reader with a question:  why do we have special 
subject matter courts for everything from family law to trade to tax and 
insolvency—but in most jurisdictions at national level, we do not have 
dedicated courts for finance?  Think about it.  World trade benefits from 
the existence of the WTO tribunal and the dedicated bar it has nurtured.  
Why then, until now, has there been no institutionalised international 
                                                                                                     
 20. For a recent article calling for “detailed scrutiny of [central counterparties’] 
dispute resolution processes,” see Joanne P. Braithwaite, OTC Derivatives, the Courts 
and Regulatory Reform, 7 CAPITAL MARKETS L. J. 364, 379 (2012). 
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dispute settlement mechanism for finance?  Is international finance law 
any less global, complicated or systemically relevant than international 
trade law?  I don’t think so.   
Judges who understand finance can be allies of the regulators and 
play an important role in fighting systemic risk in the financial markets.  
Absent an available and ready supply of persons expert enough to play 
this role, and to train and assist others to do so, too many of the judges 
around the world, if called upon to decide complex product cases and 
interpret standard contracts and terms that govern derivatives and other 
financial product trading, may represent a source of such systemic risk.  
P.R.I.M.E. Finance aims to make a positive difference in this respect. 
We must do everything that we can to foster an authoritative and settled 
body of financial market law and a better understanding of key financial 
market contracts and relevant financial market practice.  It would be 
dangerous to put all our eggs in the single basket of better regulation. 
 
